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THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax System 
Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among researchers, 
academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
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Abstract 
 
An evidence-based approach is being promoted and adopted in many public service areas, 
but tax authorities have so far only sporadically subscribed to it. We, first, present 
arguments for an evidence-based approach to tax administration and outline its main 
features. Second, studies on the effects of tax-reporting schedules are considered to 
illustrate the logic, potential challenges and outcomes of such an approach. Third, we 
discuss the main principles of an evidence-based approach, as well as its practical and 
political obstacles in the context of taxation. An evidence-based approach means basing 
administrative practices and strategies on an understanding of relevant processes that is 
obtained from systematic, theory-driven and cumulative research, using various 
appropriate methodologies including experimental and quasi-experimental evaluation 
designs. However, an evidence-based approach needs to consider the challenges posed by 
short-term orientation and risk-averse defensive postures that result from political agendas, 
public media scrutiny and intraorganisational dynamics. 
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Toward evidence-based tax administration  
Michael Wenzel and Natalie Taylor1 
 
In tax administration, as in other areas of public policy, decisions have to be made under 
conditions of complexity, controversy and uncertainty. In recent years, fields such as 
health, law and education have increasingly turned to science and research; they are 
promoting an evidence-based approach to reduce that uncertainty (for example, Chambless 
& Ollendick, 2000; Davies, 1999; Welsh & Farrington, 2001). An evidence-based 
approach is usually referred to as utilising methods of evaluation research to test the 
effectiveness of treatments or programs by systematic observation. Ideally, it uses 
randomised controlled experiments where participants are randomly assigned to various 
treatments (potentially including an untreated control group), in order to measure and 
compare the effects of each treatment uncontaminated by any other potential influences 
(Boruch, 1997). Alternatively, quasi-experimental designs may be used that lack the 
advantage of randomised assignment but involve other methods to approach an 
unequivocal attribution of observed effects to the treatment rather than other factors (Rossi 
& Freeman, 1993). For social and educational interventions, the development towards an 
evidence-based approach has progressed to a stage where a platform (the Campbell 
Collaboration) has been established to promote and conduct systematic reviews of research 
relevant to a certain question, modelled on a similar organisation in the area of medicine 
(Petrosino, Boruch, Soydan, Duggan & Sanchez-Meca, 2001). In other areas of public 
policy, there has been an equivalent push towards an evidence-based approach (see Davies, 
Nutley & Smith, 2000). In tax administration, however, experimental and evaluation 
methods have only rarely been used so far. In the present paper, we will argue and 
illustrate how an evidence-based approach could be advanced in the area of taxation, and 
also discuss the challenges and obstacles that need to be addressed.  
                                                 
1 Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra 
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The case for an evidence-based approach to tax administration 
 
It seems obvious that tax administration based on empirical evidence and intelligence 
should be more efficient and effective than tax administration based on myths, untested 
preconceptions and unsystematic experiences. Policies and strategies that are untested and 
not empirically founded may fail to produce the desired results, incur costs of their 
implementation and the costs of not having overcome the problem; or, even worse, they 
may backfire and incur additional costs. For instance, it may be a ‘common-sense’ strategy 
to fight evasion in a certain area of taxation by taking a hard stance against tax evaders and 
threatening to penalise severely any form of wrongdoing. However, such an approach 
could prove ineffective under certain conditions, because taxpayers may strongly follow 
their ethical views about paying taxes in any case, or they may see social norms as being 
rather permissive of tax evasion and thus conviction of tax evasion as having minimal 
reputation costs (Wenzel, 2003). Alternatively, such an approach of heavy-handed 
deterrence could be considered unfair, undermine trust in the Tax Office and lead to further 
reactance (Murphy, 2003; Taylor, 2003). Perhaps even more insidious, however, policies 
and actions may be based on untested assumptions and lay theories that turn out to be self-
fulfilling prophecies. For instance, a heavy-handed approach could undermine trust and 
voluntary compliance with the tax laws, and as a consequence render taxpayers only 
responsive to a heavy-handed approach that forces them into compliance. The penalty 
regime may seem to work but, in fact, it has only locked the tax authority into a 
relationship of mutual mistrust that deprives it of many other, more cooperative and 
perhaps more effective, avenues for maintaining a high level of compliance. Systematic 
research and controlled tests are required to uncover the exact effects of alternative policies 
and strategies, and to understand the complex processes involved in taxpaying behaviour. 
 
To be fair, just as a lot of research goes into the development of medical cures in the 
formation of theories about body functions and their biochemistry before the new 
treatments are eventually trialled, so there already exists quite a body of research on issues 
of taxation and taxpaying behaviour. This research has not only been of an analytical or 
theoretical nature, but also involved the collection of empirical data and evidence to test 
hypotheses and theories (for example, Roth, Scholz & Witte, 1989; Slemrod, 1992; 
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Webley, Robben, Elffers & Hessing, 1991). In this wider sense, all the contributions to the 
present volume, together with earlier research, contribute to an evidence-based approach to 
tax administration. These studies, with all their different empirical methods, are important 
to advance our understanding of the factors and processes involved in tax compliance and 
tax administration. They contribute to the development of well-founded theories that are 
necessary for innovations and new policies and strategies in tax administration.  
 
However, an essential step of an evidence-based approach requires that the innovative 
strategies are systematically tested and compared with alternative and current strategies in 
order to determine, under realistic conditions, whether and when these actually work. For 
this purpose, there is no better methodology than randomised controlled experiments and, 
as a second choice, refined quasi-experimental designs. Such evaluation methods have so 
far only been rarely applied in tax research. In a pioneering field-experiment, Schwartz and 
Orleans (1967) tested the effects of, on the one hand, a (implicit) moral appeal that made 
salient ethical reasons for truthfully paying one’s taxes and, on the other hand, sanction 
threats that made salient the severity of sanctions against tax offenders. Compared to 
control groups that either received a neutral message or no message at all, the moral appeal 
increased the amount of actual taxable income reported. In a conceptual replication of this 
study, McGraw and Scholz (1991) used videotaped messages about the moral implications 
of tax evasion versus the personal profitability of aggressive tax planning, but they did not 
find any effects on actual or self-reported taxpaying behaviour. Both studies, however, 
tested the effects of interventions applied by researchers outside the tax administration; 
they did not evaluate regulatory measures used, or to be used, by tax authorities 
themselves. In contrast, Perng (1985, cited in Boruch, 1989) describes a study conducted 
by the IRS that compared various strategies for recovering unpaid taxes, that involved 
differently timed letters, additional phone calls or offers to pay back taxes in instalments. 
More recently, the Minnesota Department of Revenue conducted a large-scale field 
experiment to measure the effectiveness of different strategies to increase voluntary tax 
compliance (Coleman, 1997), such as letters involving normative appeals (Blumenthal, 
Christian & Slemrod, 2001) and messages warning taxpayers of an increased probability of 
audit (Slemrod, Blumenthal & Christian, 2001). 
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The value of these studies stems from their rigorous designs, involving the randomised 
assignment of taxpayers to experimental conditions. They thus isolate the treatment 
variable from all other potential influences and allow an unambiguous attribution of 
observed differences to the respective treatments. Including untreated control groups, or 
alternatively treated groups, the experiments permit clear conclusions about the relative 
effectiveness of the treatment in question (for example, moral appeal, sanction threat). At 
the same time, these evaluation studies test treatments under realistic conditions (that is, as 
they would be applied later on a larger scale if proven effective), providing direct and 
generalisable evidence. However, to take full advantage of the experimental approach, 
evaluation studies should be considered as tests not only of ‘technologies’ or practices, but 
also of underlying theories (Sanderson, 2002). That is, they should preferably be designed 
in a way that also helps us understand the processes that are responsible for the 
effectiveness, or ineffectiveness, of the practices and treatments. Theory, innovation and 
research proceed in cycles where empirical evaluations of innovations feed back into the 
modification and construction of theories (Sherman, 2002). As much as sophisticated 
theories assume and explain that regulatory techniques need to be responsive to 
circumstances (Braithwaite, 2002), so empirical tests must uncover the specific conditions 
under which strategies and techniques are differentially effective. Similar to researchers 
seeking interaction effects in basic psychological research, findings of conditional 
effectiveness are better suited for competitive tests between theories and promote 
theoretical advancement.  
 
While the randomised experiment is the method of choice for an evidence-based approach, 
it is also clear that it cannot stand alone. First, other methods are often more appropriate to 
explore a new area and to develop ideas and hypotheses. For instance, focus groups may 
provide an efficient overview of the main issues and sentiments, while interviews yield an 
in-depth understanding of people’s cognitions, feelings and motivations. At the same time, 
it needs to be emphasised that public administrations’ heavy reliance on focus groups does 
not qualify for an evidence-based approach. Given the group dynamics among participants 
and the lack of independence of presented views, a focus group (as it is usually conducted) 
constitutes no more than a single observation. It can generate ideas but not put them to a 
rigorous test. Second, some innovations simply do not allow for an experimental study (for 
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example, changes to tax legislation); or, none of the experimental designs that can be 
applied in the situation may be ideal (see Cooper & Wenzel, 2002, who used a scenario-
based experiment to test implications of a different tax legislation). To deal with these 
empirical problems, we need a variety of studies, using different methodological 
approaches and designs (Sanderson, 2002). Each study in itself may be suboptimal, but 
their cumulative insights may permit a well-founded answer to a problem. There may not 
be proof but sufficient circumstantial evidence. An evidence-based approach thus involves 
the cumulative use of multi-method studies, including experiments or quasi-experiments 
with clever designs, which put innovations to a clear test and advance our theoretical 
understanding. 
 
Tax compliance is a complex and dynamic phenomenon. Tax administrators face a 
difficult task of constantly inventing and reinventing strategies and policies to deal with, 
and stay on top of, the problem. They would be well advised to use the tools of the social 
sciences and engage in systematic theory-building, empirical research and rigorous 
evaluation designs. Let us give an illustration. 
 
An example: Tax-reporting schedules 
 
One frequent approach adopted by the Tax Office to encourage compliance with the tax 
laws is tax-reporting schedules. These are forms sent to taxpayers that request additional 
details on a certain tax matter. For instance, taxpayers who indicate in their tax return that 
they own rental property (or who owned rental property according to their previous tax 
return) may be sent rental property schedules on which they are asked to give details about 
rental income derived from each property as well as expenses that they incurred and want 
to claim as deductions. These forms are usually sent out with an accompanying letter that 
reminds taxpayers of their responsibility to make correct statements in their tax return or 
face potential fines.  
 
In previous years, the Tax Office used rental property schedules in programs aimed at ‘risk 
groups’, whose profile and statements in their tax returns identified them as being worthy 
of closer scrutiny in relation to their rental tax affairs. The identification of these risk 
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groups was based on somewhat arbitrary and varied criteria. Tax Office experience with 
these programs indicated that the schedules appeared to be successful in encouraging 
compliance. However, only a controlled experiment could unambiguously verify whether, 
to what extent and why this was the case. Further, the positive experiences with the 
schedules led the Tax Office to consider an expansion of their use to taxpayers who did not 
fall into any of the earlier risk categories. But would the schedules have any positive effect 
for the broader category of rental property owners? Moreover, it was in fact suggested the 
schedules could be added to TaxPack (that is, the Tax Office’s booklet of instructions and 
forms for the basic individual tax return) as a regular feature of any return for taxpayers 
owning rental property. However, would the schedules still have positive effects on tax 
compliance and tax collection when made a routine part of the tax forms? This basically 
raised the question of how rental property schedules affected tax-reporting behaviour and 
the underlying mechanisms of their effectiveness.  
 
If schedules had positive effects on the collection of taxes mainly through the deterring 
message that accompanied them (that is, warning taxpayers of the prospect of fines when 
making false statements about their tax affairs), then schedules should lose their impact 
when being a routine part of the tax return without the personally addressed warning. 
However, in this case the schedules themselves would be rather superfluous and a more 
cost-effective brief warning letter should achieve the same result. In contrast, if schedules 
exerted positive effects on tax compliance mainly through clarifying the rental expenses 
that taxpayers are allowed to claim as deductions (that is, through educating taxpayers), 
then the inclusion of the schedules in TaxPack should bear positive results; and it would do 
so on a much broader scale and much more cost-effectively than by letter. Finally, 
however, it could be the case that the schedules worked through a combination of both 
processes; that is, through clarifying allowable deductions and taxpayers’ responsibilities 
as well as reinforcing the perception that violations of these responsibilities will be 
punished. This process could only be achieved through the present use of schedules, but 
not through more cost-effective letters or through the inclusion of schedules in TaxPack. 
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A Randomised Experiment 
 
To address these issues, we first conducted a randomised experiment (Taylor & Wenzel, 
2001a; Wenzel & Taylor, 2002). In this study, 9000 taxpayers (‘risk’ groups and ‘non-risk’ 
groups), who prepared their tax returns themselves and were not registered with a tax 
practitioner, were randomly subjected to one of five experimental conditions. The ‘letter 
only’ group was sent only a warning letter that reminded taxpayers of their obligations and 
pointed to penalties for non-compliance. In the ‘no return schedule’ condition, taxpayers 
were additionally sent schedules as an educational resource for their own use only; that is, 
they should use the schedules to determine their taxes, but they were not to return the 
schedules to the Tax Office and thus not to provide details that could be further scrutinised. 
In the ‘return schedule’ conditions (with or without a detailed booklet), taxpayers were sent 
schedules to complete and return to the Tax Office, along with the accompanying letter 
detailing tax obligations and possible fines. A fifth group of taxpayers did not receive any 
communication from the Tax Office and served as a control group. 
 
Results showed (for both risk and non-risk groups) a significant effect of the experimental 
conditions on the amount of rental deductions claimed in the tax return. Statistically 
controlling for a number of background variables (including previous claims and income), 
in the two return schedule conditions, taxpayers claimed significantly fewer deductions 
than in the control condition and the other two experimental conditions. In contrast, 
taxpayers in the letter only and the no-return schedule conditions did not differ in their 
deduction claims from the control group. The findings thus indicated that the schedule 
program as practised in the past had a distinctive effect and could not easily be substituted 
by a mere deterrence letter. Neither did their effect seem to rest merely on their 
informational value. Moreover, the results encouraged an extension of the schedule 
program to taxpayers other than those previously defined as risk groups.  
 
Because tax-reporting schedules as a routine part of TaxPack would not be accompanied 
by a personally addressed deterring message, it could be argued that their impact would be 
limited to an educational process. Because the findings of the experiment did not support 
such an educational mechanism, there is reason to be skeptical about the effectiveness of 
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schedules if they were incorporated in the standard tax return. However, these implications 
of the experiment could be questioned on two grounds. First, there are possible questions 
about the internal validity of the results; that is, there may be an alternative explanation for 
the findings. It could be the case that taxpayers in the no-return schedule condition 
discarded the schedules, once they realised that they did not have to use them. They might 
not have taken great notice of the information included in the schedules, preventing these 
from having an educational effect. In principle, however, such an informational effect 
might be possible, if taxpayers were required to take notice of the schedules. Second, the 
theoretical implications of the findings might not be so clear-cut. Namely, as a regular part 
of TaxPack, tax-reporting schedules would indeed have to be returned to the Tax Office. 
Even though they would not be accompanied by a reinforcing deterring message, they 
might still be seen as an instrument through which the Tax Office could scrutinise the 
details provided and assess their accuracy. That is, a deterring effect (in combination with a 
clarification of the rules) could still be possible. 
 
A Quasi-Experiment 
 
The previous study helped illuminate the processes involved in effects of rental property 
schedules. However, questions remain and it cannot be said for certain whether or not 
schedules as a regular part of the tax return would be effective or not. Of course, in 
principle, this problem would ask for a different experimental approach, where two 
versions of TaxPack would be issued to random samples of taxpayers – one with, the other 
without, a rental property schedule. We could then unambiguously assess the effects of 
schedules included in the tax return in comparison with the standard tax return as a control. 
Obviously, however, such an experiment is not easy to conduct. First, TaxPack is available 
at various public outlets (for example, newsagents) and thus there would be little, if any, 
control possible over who uses which tax forms. Second, it would be possible for taxpayers 
to discover that different versions of TaxPack have been issued, which could lead to public 
controversy about inconsistency of treatment, being used as guinea-pigs, and so on. The 
media backlash could easily shadow any gains to be received from a successful trial of the 
schedules. Hence, the ideal evaluation study cannot be conducted in this case. The only 
alternative is the collection of intelligence from various alternative approaches, which are 
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all suboptimal by themselves but cumulatively lead to an understanding that could become 
the basis for an informed decision.  
 
In a second approach, we tried to take advantage of an existing group of taxpayers in the 
Australian tax system who have to provide, as part of their regular tax return, all the details 
required in rental property schedules (Taylor & Wenzel, 2001b). Namely, in contrast to 
self-preparing taxpayers who use TaxPack and thus lodge their tax return in paper form, 
self-preparing taxpayers who use e-tax (the Internet lodgment facility provided by the Tax 
Office) have to complete schedules as part of their tax return if they own rental property. 
This ‘natural’ occurrence of taxpayers who need to fill in rental schedules on a routine 
basis allowed us to combine data from a sample of these taxpayers with data from groups 
of the earlier experiment for a quasi-experimental investigation.  
 
Specifically, focussing on the non-risk sample from the previous study, we compared two 
groups of those paper lodgers, namely the ‘return schedule’ group (without information 
booklet) and the control group, with a new randomly selected group of rental property 
owners who prepared and lodged their tax return themselves electronically via e-tax. These 
electronic lodgers were selected on the basis that they lodged electronically in the current 
year but had lodged on paper in earlier years, and had not been sent a schedule to complete 
before. This meant that they had completed a schedule only once (in the same year as the 
paper lodgers) and were thus comparable on this dimension to the paper lodgers. We 
reasoned that, if ‘return schedule’ paper lodgers claimed fewer rental deductions than 
electronic lodgers (as they did compared to the control group), this would indicate that 
schedules are only effective when personally addressed to a taxpayer and reinforced by a 
deterring message; a routine inclusion in the tax return (TaxPack) would likely be 
ineffective. In contrast, if e-tax lodgers also claimed fewer deductions than the paper 
lodger control group (and no different from the return schedule group), this would suggest 
that the routine inclusion of rental property schedules has positive effects on tax collection 
and compliance. Hence, they should also be included in TaxPack. 
 
While it might appear reasonably straightforward to compare rental data between 
electronic and paper lodgments, such a comparison is in fact problematic due to the lack of 
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randomisation. The previous study identified a population of paper lodgers from which 
random samples were extracted and randomly allocated to the experimental and control 
conditions. Random sampling from the same population and random assignment to 
conditions meant that every taxpayer in the population of identified paper lodgers had 
exactly the same chance of being assigned to any one of the experimental and control 
conditions. As a consequence, any differences that might exist between taxpayers would be 
evenly distributed across all conditions; there would be no systematic difference between 
groups prior to the delivery of any treatment. Further, any significant differences between 
groups in the dependent variable (deduction claims) had to be attributed to their differential 
treatment. In contrast, in the second study, we compared groups of taxpayers who chose 
themselves to lodge by paper or electronically and who thus assigned themselves to the 
treatment conditions. This choice can be correlated with other variables that, in turn, can be 
related to the dependent variable (deduction claims). Consequently, any differences 
between groups in the dependent variable might be attributable to prior differences 
between the two populations of paper lodgers and e-tax lodgers, rather than (or in addition 
to) their differential treatment. The internal validity of such a ‘non-equivalent control 
group design’ is problematic. The only way of reducing this problem is to increase the 
equivalence of the group, for example by controlling statistically for a priori differences 
between the groups (West, Biesanz & Pitts, 2000).  
 
For instance, in our study it was established that e-tax lodgers were significantly younger 
(M = 42 years) than both paper lodger groups, while the return schedule and control groups 
did not differ in age (Ms = 46 and 47 years, respectively). E-tax users also tended to lodge 
earlier (M = 12th week) than the paper lodger groups, who in turn did not differ in their 
lodgment time (both M = 15th week). Moreover, electronic lodgers had significantly higher 
taxable incomes (M = A$43 647) than both paper lodger groups, which again did not differ 
in their incomes (Ms = A$37 848 and A$36 238, respectively), the latter reflecting the 
successful randomisation in the earlier study. (Note that, for the multivariate analysis, all 
monetary variables were square root transformed to improve their distribution.) 
 
Statistically controlling for these differences as covariates, the study revealed a significant 
effect of the experimental group (see Table 1). Paper lodgers who were sent schedules to 
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return to the Tax Office claimed significantly fewer rental deductions than the control 
group, as already established in the earlier study, but also significantly less deductions than 
e-tax lodgers claimed. Rental deduction claims of e-tax lodgers did not differ from the ones 
of the paper-lodging control group. A corresponding (reverse) pattern was obtained for net 
rental income, defined as gross rental income minus rental deductions. 
 
Table 1: Analysis of covariance for rental deduction claims 
 
Source df F p
Covariates    
     Rental Deduction Claims in Previous Year 1 784.11 0.000 
     Current Taxable Income 1 87.68 0.000 
     Current Gross Rental Income 1 841.51 0.000 
     Age 1 51.73 0.000 
     Gender 1 0.25 ns 
     Lodgment Time 1 20.86 0.000 
     Lodgment of Schedulea 1 3.06 ns 
Experimental Group 2 6.52 0.002 
Error 1461   
Total 1471   
Estimated Means  square-root transformed untransformedb
     Paper lodgers, schedule condition 69.77          $5950 
     Paper lodgers, control condition 73.01          $6563 
     Electronic lodgers (routine schedules) 73.09          $6476 
a Some taxpayers in the control condition lodged rental schedules without being required to, while some 
paper lodgers in the schedule condition failed to lodge a schedule. Lodgment of schedules was thus included 
as a covariate in the analysis. However, it did not have a significant effect beyond the effects of experimental 
group. 
b Means for a complementary analysis without transformation of monetary variables, yielding similar effects. 
 
These findings suggest that rental property schedules are not effective in reducing 
deduction claims and increasing tax compliance when they have become a routine part of a 
tax return, as is the case for electronic lodgers. Together with the findings from the 
randomised experiment, the results rather suggest that being personally targeted by the Tax 
Office to complete and return the schedule drives the effect of tax-reporting schedules. 
Paper lodgers who received a personally addressed schedule from the Tax Office might 
have felt that the Tax Office watched them. They might have felt deterred from making 
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wrongful claims. In contrast, e-tax lodgers who completed similar schedules and provided 
the same kind of information did so as part of their lodgment routine. As a consequence, 
they might not have felt a heightened degree of surveillance (similar to paper lodgers who 
did not receive a schedule). That is, the results would suggest that rental schedules are 
effective because of their deterrence effect on taxpayers. If personal targeting (with the 
implication of surveillance) is the key to obtaining lower rental deduction claims, the 
routine inclusion of schedules in TaxPack is unlikely to produce the desired outcomes.  
 
While this may be so, we need to reiterate a note of caution. The nature of the second 
study, lacking randomisation and thus strict a priori equivalence of the experimental 
groups, prevents any strict conclusions. Even though we controlled statistically for a 
number of differences between the groups, it is not clear whether there are not other, 
unmeasured or hidden, variables that could account for the differences in deduction claims. 
In fact, the tax return data we used only contained certain demographic background 
characteristics. However, there might be other relevant demographic taxpayer 
characteristics, such as their education level or their stage in the investment lifecycle (for 
example, having more or less recent investments and thus more or less outstanding debts, 
which of course is partly correlated with age). Further, there may be important attitudinal 
differences between electronic and paper lodgers that we could not take into account. As a 
consequence, we cannot be completely sure that the observed difference in rental 
deductions between e-tax lodgers and paper lodgers required to return a schedule was due 
to the different application mode of rental schedules. 
 
Moreover, it could be the case that the form of lodgment itself (electronic versus paper) 
involved processes that could conceal the true effect of rental property schedules. That is, 
if there was anything inherent in electronic lodgment that made taxpayers less compliant or 
more risky in their tax-reporting behaviour, this could also account for the different level 
of deduction claims compared to return schedule paper lodgers. It could have counteracted 
any positive effects of the tax-reporting schedules and brought e-tax lodgers’ deduction 
claims to the level of the control group. It is unclear whether such processes did play a role 
and what these processes could be. One, as yet remote, possibility could be extrapolated 
from research showing that computer-mediated communication can lead to a reduction in 
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accountability (for example, Walther, Anderson & Park, 1994). Perhaps e-tax lodgment 
also involves a reduction in accountability, or a stronger conformity with perceived 
ingroup norms and differentiation from outgroup norms such as the tax authority’s 
(Postmes, Spears & Lea, 1998). Clearly, this is so far speculation, but such processes 
cannot be ruled out and were not controlled in our quasi-experiment.  
 
Further evidence on the effects of tax-reporting schedules as well as research on the 
implications of electronic versus paper lodgment would be necessary. However, these two 
studies already illustrate the logic of an evidence-based approach. They demonstrate the 
value of systematic research, as it significantly advances our understanding of processes 
and mechanisms – in particular, when the research is strongly driven by theory, uses 
thoughtful designs and applies refined statistical procedures. At the same time, the studies 
demonstrate that a research question or research context rarely allows for one decisive 
experiment. Instead, we need to analyse the limitations of individual studies and 
complement them with other studies that may compensate for these limitations or follow-
up alternative explanations. Cumulatively, they would contribute to our understanding of 
the relevant processes involved in tax-reporting behaviour and thus allow better informed 
decisions in the effective administration of the tax system.  
 
Principles and obstacles of an evidence-based approach 
Principles 
 
Following on from our earlier arguments and the empirical illustration, let us now present 
what we consider as guiding principles of an evidence-based approach.  
 
Multi-methodology. An evidence-based approach in a comprehensive sense uses multiple 
empirical methods, as appropriate to the specific requirements of the situation. Exploratory 
studies are useful to canvass a field and generate theoretical ideas. In-depth qualitative 
studies are also valuable for situations with a small number of available respondents. 
Surveys are ideal for larger representative samples and for uncovering the relationships 
between multiple variables and concepts. Laboratory experiments are ideal for testing 
causal relationships. Note that experimental studies, with small convenience samples, can 
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also be used to mimic and pretest larger evaluation studies. For instance, Wenzel (2002) 
argued that taxpayers may systematically misperceive social taxpaying norms and believe 
other taxpayers are more permissive of tax evasion than they actually are. An intervention 
that demonstrates the misperceptions to participants should encourage them to change their 
perception and reduce tendencies to cheat on taxes. This approach was first pretested in a 
questionnaire study with a student sample and, based on encouraging results, it was then 
applied and tested in the field.  
 
Experimental and quasi-experimental designs. Evaluations of interventions in the field, 
under realistic conditions and with a sample of the population to which they would be 
applied later, are an essential part of these methodological tools and have so far clearly 
been under-utilised. Here, the ideal approach is the randomised controlled experiment 
which allows a maximum of internal and external validity. Where randomised experiments 
are not possible, quasi-experimental designs can be feasible and effective alternatives (see 
Campbell & Stanley, 1966; Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2002). 
 
Methodological and statistical sophistication. The various methodological approaches 
require expertise for their sound and professional conduct. The experimental and quasi-
experimental approaches in particular demand a certain statistical finesse if we want to 
extract the optimum from our data. As shown in our empirical example, quasi-
experimental designs with nonrandom groups are burdened with the problem of alternative 
explanations and we need to apply refined methods such as matched sampling and/or 
statistical adjustments in order to increase confidence in the internal validity of the findings 
(West et al., 2000). However, also for randomised experiments it may be useful to control 
statistically for covariates if we want to increase the statistical power and, for instance, 
compensate for a relatively small sample size compared to great variance in the dependent 
variables. Such great variability is a problem in particular in tax research when monetary 
tax details are used as dependent variables, as these do not have a natural range limit, often 
possess skewed distributions and reflect the great diversity in people’s tax situations.  
 
Cumulative and theory-driven research. No single empirical study, not a pure randomised 
experiment nor one involving the most sophisticated statistics, is rarely sufficient to answer 
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all questions pertaining to an issue. We usually need several studies and empirical 
approaches, compensating for each other’s methodological deficiencies, systematically 
testing hypotheses and ruling out alternative explanations. We need cumulative research to 
systematically build up our theories, because it is from theories that we derive innovations 
and ideas for practice. In turn, practice and the application of innovations are an invaluable 
test of the relevance and validity of our theories. It is therefore important that we conceive 
and design our evaluation studies not only as tests of the usefulness of a certain treatment 
or ‘technology’, but also as empirical tests of underlying theories. Imagine we had 
designed our randomised experiment only as a test of the ‘technology’ (rental schedules). 
We probably would have simply compared the use of rental property schedules (sent to 
taxpayers for them to complete and return) with an untreated control group. We would 
have found that the schedules were effective in reducing deduction claims, but we would 
not have known why this was the case, whether it was necessary for the schedules to be 
returned, or whether a simple letter would have achieved the same result. Conceiving the 
evaluation as a theoretical test, we need to think about alternative explanations and 
competing theoretical processes, and we need to try and rule these out empirically. 
 
International perspectives and theoretical integration. The principle of cumulative 
research not only applies to one’s own work. Rather, research on a certain topic is usually 
being pursued at various fronts nationally and internationally. It is important to take note of 
research efforts in other countries; to try and learn from other people’s experiences and 
findings. In taxation, people may quickly discard research in foreign countries and 
different jurisdictions as irrelevant, because of different legal, cultural and economic 
conditions. However, again, the integration of research needs to occur primarily at a 
theoretical level. Instead of simply extrapolating from other people’s research findings to 
one’s own context, we need to take account of the theoretical meaning of such findings. At 
a theoretical level, we can factor in differences in various background conditions if these 
are theoretically relevant. Moreover, if there is a sufficient body of studies on a certain 
question, we might be able to test statistically the relevance of these background variables 
by means of meta-analysis. That is, cumulation itself can become a test of theories and a 
basis for theory formation. All the more important are platforms, such as the Campbell 
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Collaboration, that promote systematic reviews of international evaluation studies 
(Petrosino et al., 2001). 
 
Timely research. Our research needs to be current. Evidence does not reflect absolute and 
eternal truths, but is rather influenced by context and time. Although differences in 
research findings between times (as much as between cultures and jurisdictions) can be 
explained and integrated theoretically, for current or immediate applications and strategies 
we need current evidence. Moreover, even theories and paradigms are more or less 
appropriate for different times and do change. For instance, the more recent emphasis on 
the role of trust and legitimacy in governance and public administration (for example, 
Braithwaite & Levi, 1998; Cook, 2001) may not only reflect an advanced theoretical 
understanding of relevant processes, but also an understanding of the real advances of our 
societies. The area of taxation, in particular, seems to be in constant flux due to regular 
changes in tax law and administration, tax preparer products and compliance behaviour, as 
well as the wider economy and government. An evidence-based approach needs to respond 
to such change. 
 
Obstacles 
 
The evidence-based approach is less a confined one-off project than rather a 
comprehensive philosophy for dealing with public policy and administration. It comes with 
substantial demands and challenges that may constitute severe obstacles for the adoption of 
this philosophy, particularly because of the many external pressures and internal dynamics 
that affect a complex public institution such as the Tax Office. We will conclude with a 
discussion of some of the potential obstacles.  
 
The too hard basket. As pointed out before, the evidence-based approach requires a 
considerable level of methodological and statistical expertise, theoretical knowledge and 
abilities of theoretical analysis and integration. It demands human resources for reviewing 
the existing literature, the derivation of research questions, the design of studies and data 
analysis. Tax administrators may find the task too complicated to pursue. Alternatively, 
they may seek expertise from outside, for instance in collaborations with academics. The 
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Centre for Tax System Integrity at the Australian National University is an example of 
such a successful collaboration. 
 
Threat to professional identity. A collaboration with outsiders, however, may easily be 
seen by staff of an institution (in particular, when the aims and terms of the collaboration 
are not transparent to them) as intrusion, challenging their own experience and expertise, 
and bringing unwelcome change. Given that people derive part of their identity from their 
work, from their success and competence in their area, such apparent intrusion may 
threaten their identity and self-esteem, prompting reactions of defence and resistance. 
Likewise, part of our identity is based on continuity, and any apparent change inflicted on 
staff may threaten their identity as well. To overcome these problems, it would need to be 
emphasised that an approach based on empirical evidence does not question the value of 
professional experience for the generation of hypotheses and ideas, but, eventually, the 
hypotheses and ideas will need to be put to the test of systematic observation. If staff are 
being involved and given some ownership of the research, the process should be less 
threatening. Generally, however, it is the case that an evidence-based approach requires 
greater adaptability and the preparedness to give up long-held beliefs if not confirmed by 
empirical evidence. It would therefore be favourable to promote an organisational culture 
that values and rewards such adaptability. 
 
Risk-averseness and lack of commitment. Systematic observations also make tax 
administrations and their staff more vulnerable to criticism, because research findings 
speak to some extent for themselves. Research may fail to support an innovation in which 
the Tax Office placed much hope or, even worse, it may fail to support empirically the 
effectiveness of long-practised procedures. While, in contrast, the evidence may also 
produce more favourable results that vindicate established procedures, people may be risk-
averse and avoid any possibility of negative outcomes. Further, having experienced a 
failure, staff may not be committed enough to the approach to continue with it, learn from 
and build on the experience. Probably, one important factor that could counter these 
impediments is effective leadership and the expressed commitment by top executives to an 
evidence-based approach. This would relieve lower-level managers of responsibility in 
deciding whether certain empirical projects should proceed despite the risk of negative 
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findings. It means rewarding the pursuit of an evidence-based approach regardless of the 
results it produces. 
 
Public scrutiny and bad publicity. Nonetheless, and particularly in the domain of taxation, 
results will inevitably draw the attention of the public and the media. If certain findings 
reflect negatively on the work of the tax authority, then this can negatively affect the 
public’s trust in the institution as well as perceptions of its efficiency and fairness. 
Similarly, the research procedures themselves may risk adverse effects on public 
perception, for instance when they seem to imply additional compliance costs (for 
example, having to fill in an additional form or survey, or simply being sent a letter to 
read) or when differential treatment (as part of an experimental evaluation) seems 
inconsistent and unfair. This is a particular problem for an institution, such as the Tax 
Office, that is often under close public and media scrutiny. Consequently, certain empirical 
projects may not be pursued at all or their conduct may be delayed and delayed again for 
fears of coming at a critical time. Empirical interventions may be watered down to an 
extent where they lose their distinctive theoretical meaning and are no longer based on 
pretest evidence. All this can occur due to a sudden change of mind of the responsible Tax 
Officers, after substantial investments into the project have already been made (by the 
consulting academics, for example), resulting in frustration and little motivation to initiate 
similar projects in the future. While administrations such as the Tax Office are well 
advised to monitor their public image, recognise public sentiment and strive to maintain 
public confidence and trust in the organisation, this must not mean succumbing to a short-
term perspective and merely responding to the political climate of the day. In fact, the 
management of the relationship with the public has to be conceived as a long-term 
objective. For a long-term view, the cumulation of empirical evidence of uncompromised 
quality and its theoretical integration are vital. Again, it is up to the leaders of an 
administration to promote and commit to such a perspective and to embed it into the 
organisational culture. 
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Conclusion 
 
Despite considerable practical obstacles and challenges, an evidence-based approach is the 
only reasonable and responsible one for public services and tax administrations. Given the 
complexity of the tax system as well as taxpaying behaviour, with its economic, legal, 
social and cultural aspects, a more scientific approach seems most promising in order to 
manage the complexity and reduce uncertainty. Given the tax authority’s tasks to 
administer the tax system efficiently and collect the lawful revenue effectively, it has the 
responsibility to apply an approach that promotes cycles of theoretical understanding, 
innovation and outcome evaluation. An evidence-based approach implies systematic and 
cumulative research that uses a variety of empirical methods, including experimental and 
quasi-experimental evaluation studies in order to assess the effects of innovative 
techniques under realistic conditions. Using intelligent theory-driven designs, the research 
will not only tell us when a certain intervention is effective but also why. It will improve 
our theoretical understanding of the relevant processes and lead to new innovations, 
ensuring that Tax Office policy and processes are continually being improved and moving 
in the right direction. 
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